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In his seminal text “Allegorical Procedures: Appropri-
ation and Montage in Contemporary Art,” Benjamin 
Buchloh discusses Robert Rauschenberg’s work Erased 
de Kooning Drawing from 1953, “one of the first exam-
ples of allegorization in post-New York school art.” 1 The 
work consists of a drawing that Rauschenberg obtained 
from abstract expressionist painter Willem de Kooning 
with the explicit aim to erase it. After erasing the draw-
ing — a repetitive action of gathering the signs left by de 
Kooning on the paper in charcoal, oil paint, pencil, and 
crayon, reading them, and copying them out through 
various means of erasure — the work was framed and 
affixed with a label carrying the work ’s title.2 Erased de 
Kooning Drawing thus seems to confront us as a drawing 
that is also the final palimpsest3 — would it be possible 
to erase it again? –, an allegory of unreadability with the 
semblance of complete readability as one of those “first 
examples.” 
For Buchloh, the allegorical nature of the work is 
apparent through the “procedures of appropriation, the 
depletion of the confiscated image, the superimposition 
or doubling of a visual text by a second text, and the 
shift of attention and reading to the framing device.”4 
Although such an analysis of Rauschenberg’s work, as 
a supposed precursor to the practices of Institutional 
Critique, is certainly not without merit, I remain stub-
bornly attracted to the surface itself, to what is discerni-
ble despite the thorough act of erasure, to what — despite 
all — remains readable, as if the very absence of de Koon-
ing reveals him as most present, or, as Rauschenberg 
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to think a possible leftist, progressive, anti-fascist — even 
aligning these adjectives seems an insurmountable obsta-
cle — politics.
In his reading of Rousseau’s text, De Man attends to 
a number of problematic conceptual and figural polari-
ties, argumentative incongruities, and the general un-
decidability as to what genre — literary, political — the 
Social Contract belongs. He then specifically marks out 
the moment in another text, “Du bonheur social,” where 
Rousseau “shift[s] from a (deconstructed) binary model 
[between personal and public well-being] to this still uni-
dentified ‘other’ model.”12 This “other”  model, the model 
of the contract in which “everyone puts his will, his 
property, his strength, and his person in common, under 
the direction of the general will,”13 so De Man claims, is 
taken up again in the Social Contract. De Man ferrets out 
the numerous places in which the text cannot live up to 
its own expectations, making promises and drafting con-
tracts that can never be honored, up to the point where 
the status of the Social Contract itself, vis-à-vis an “actu-
al ”  social contract set up according to its specifications, 
turns out to be completely untenable as text:
To the extent that it never ceases to advocate the 
necessity for political legislation and to elaborate the 
principles on which such legislation could be based, it 
resorts to the principles of authority that it undermines. 
We know this structure to be characteristic of what we 
have called allegories of unreadability. Such an allegory 
is metafigural: it is an allegory of a figure (for example, 
metaphor) which relapses into the figure it deconstructs. 
The Social Contract falls under this heading to the extent 
that it is indeed structured like an aporia: it persists in 
performing what it has shown to be impossible to do. As 
such, we call it an allegory.14
suggests, as “poetry.”5 It is perhaps the allegorical na-
ture of the image itself that propels me (and Buchloh) to 
read it, because of, as Craig Owens suggests, the “blatant 
disregard for aesthetic categories,” the genre-bending or 
gender-bending, if you will, of allegory, in its “reciprocity 
[…] between the visual and the verbal.”6 Or perhaps we 
should take our departure from Geoffrey Sirc, when he 
refers to Erased de Kooning Drawing as “anti-commodity.”7
If politics, at the onset of Western political history and 
theory, is expressed through public speech on the agora, 
the marketplace, allegory is that which “speaks differ-
ently”  (allēgoreō, from all’ agoreuō), in a veiled and sub-
tractive manner, irreducible to public, institutionalized 
political discourse. In Walter Benjamin’s oeuvre, which 
will be here my provisional point of departure, allegory 
is brought forward as politically disruptive in the sense 
that it resists totalization, separating “visual being from 
meaning”  and therefore resisting the esthetization of 
politics practiced by fascism (and in fact the large ma-
jority of contemporary politics).8 Benjamin thus seems 
to suggest a strategy which tentatively would ally alle-
gory — against the logic of the symbol9 — with possible 
projects of the politicization of art,10 and, more generally, 
attempts to rethink the political status-quo. It is in the 
context of Benjamin’s notion of the political potential of 
allegory that I would like to revisit a fragment from Paul 
de Man’s Allegories of Reading that features a reading of 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Social Contract.11 Our initial, and 
necessarily incomplete confrontation with this fragment 
will then serve as a springboard to analyze two more ex-
plicitly political projects, which, like Benjamin, attempt 
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per se therefore continues to be a seemingly insuperable 
obstacle to philosophies that are strongly invested in the 
symbol, that is, in the inseverable bond between sign and 
meaning. A pertinent example here would be Quentin 
Meillassoux’s impressive, yet ultimately unsuccessful 
attempt to clearly demarcate the “meaningless sign,” 
which, however ironically, happens through a fable, that 
is, an allegorical form.18
Rauschenberg’s Erased de Kooning Drawing exists 
precisely at this limit of readability between meaningful 
and meaningless sign, drawing out the precise point at 
which an image becomes allegorical and therefore read-
able: a total erasure in which visual being and meaning 
become indistinguishable. A counterpart can be located 
in Marcel Broodthaers’s Un coup de dés jamais n’aboli-
ra le hasard from 1969,19 which appropriates Stéphane 
Mallarmé’s famous symbolist poem with the same title, 
which Meillassoux affirms to be a “code”  that needs be 
“deciphered.”20 Averse to any decipherment or decod-
ing, Broodthaers violently rips the poem’s visual being 
and meaning apart, and linearizes the disjunct phrases 
of the poem in the place of its original preface as prose 
text, while blackening out and therefore emphasizing the 
visual quality of the typography. On the cover, Brood-
thaers replaces Mallarmé’s name with his own, and the 
word poème with image. Words and images seem to enter 
into a zone of indistinction.
Both Rauschenberg and Broodthaers’s works, 
therefore, allegorize incomplete processes of allegori-
zation . Traces remain, the erasure cannot measure up 
to its own expectations. De Kooning is still present in 
his purported absence, even more if we realize that on 
the backside of the erased drawing there is another, 
unerased De Kooning drawing, the figure of a woman. 
We accept this unreadability not as a defect of Rousseau’s 
text, or as some perverse effect of De Man’s thorough 
and incisive reading, but as an epistemological obsta-
cle that turns out — following the best of philosophical 
traditions — to be ontologically fundamental, as it will 
appear that this text and the aporias it harbors partakes 
in a logic in which the search for the best art of govern-
ment insistently thematizes “reading” — including the 
quotidian act of reading itself — as limit or threshold of 
political activity. Reading, which for De Man is an in-
herently deconstructive activity, therefore appears to be 
something that cannot be fully politically appropriated.15 
We will try to support this tentative suggestion by zoom-
ing in on two propositions that explicitly incorporate, if 
not somehow depart from Rousseau’s text, and which can 
be construed so as to precisely fit into each other’s limit 
points — Michel Foucault’s “socialist governmentality” 
and Giorgio Agamben’s “form-of-life” — precisely at the 
point where both have recourse to the avatar of the Prous-
tian figure of the idle, inoperative reader, who constantly 
must “attempt the reconciliation between imagination 
and action.”16
If we follow Benjamin that allegory separates “visual be-
ing from meaning,” a prose text, such as the one you are 
currently reading, constitutes an allegorical extreme: its 
visual being is seemingly fully disjunct from its mean-
ing, and therefore every text is by definition allegorical. 
Readability in itself is an allegorical effect. Philology has 
acknowledged this already since its inception, and it is 
therefore not surprising that De Man calls upon it in 
accounting for his deconstructive readings.17 Readability 
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the door to the politicization or art, but always threaten 
to destabilize such an appropriation. As Owens suggests, 
“[b]ecause allegory usurps its object it comports within 
itself a danger, the possibility of perversion.”22
In his analysis of the concepts of biopolitical power and 
governmentality, which he developed over the course 
of a series of lectures at the Collège de France, notably 
in Security, Territory, Population and The Birth of Biopol-
itics,23 Michel Foucault locates the origin of biopolitics 
as a “political power”  that assigns itself “the task of 
administering life”  in a break with the previously dom-
inant concept of sovereign power in the seventeenth 
century,24 followed by the explosive development and 
increasing primacy of the art of government in the 
eighteenth century.25 He associates this development of 
what he terms governmentality with, among others, the 
work of Rousseau, who signals the shift in meaning of 
the word economy from “father’s management of the 
family’s goods”  to a “political economy […] that can no 
longer be reduced to the old model of the family”  (STP 
142–3). The “allegories of unreadability”  uncovered by 
De Man are constitutive of this shift, a translation — as 
we will see — from the theological to the political sphere 
that will not cease to create its own points of incompre-
hension.26
Throughout his lectures, Foucault defines the de-
velopment of different modes of governmentality, of 
managing and administering the physical and social life 
of populations, as a type of political thinking operative in 
the liberal tradition, such as the French physiocrats, the 
German ordoliberals, and the contemporary neoliberal 
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As Rauschenberg suggests: “The documentation of the 
work is built in.”21 The amount of erasure could still be 
tentatively deduced from the drawing on the backside, 
in the same way that Mallarmé’s poem could potentially 
be reconstructed from the preface to which Broodthaers 
evacuated it. Both works are untenable as images, and 
that is perhaps why we feel the impulse to read them. 
Contrary to what Buchloh may want us to believe, any 
politically productive shift of attention from display to 
mode of display, from text to metatext, from work to 
parergon that would be accomplished by these works is 
fragile and incomplete. Allegorical procedures may open 
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sketch out above — as the obverse of governmentality, or 
perhaps as a cover-up of its absence. 
I think that if we are  
so strongly inclined to put  
to socialism this indiscreet question  
of truth that we never address to liberalism  
– “Are you true or are you false”  — it is precisely  
because socialism lacks an intrinsic governmental  
rationality, and because it replaces this essential, and  
still not overcome [absence of] an internal governmen-
tal rationality, with the relationship of conformity to a 
text. The relationship of conformity to a text, or a se-
ries of texts, is charged with concealing this absence 
of governmental rationality. A way of reading and 
interpreting is advanced that must found socialism  
and indicate the very limits and possibilities of its 
potential action, whereas what it really needs is  
to define for itself its way of doing things and  
its way of governing. I think the importance 
 of the text in socialism is commensurate 
 with the lacuna constituted by the  
absenceof a socialist art  
of government. 
(bP 93–4, my emphasis)
After this remarkable passage, in which “reading and 
interpreting” become placeholders for “governmental 
rationality” in a mode that recalls De Man’s reading of 
Rousseau, Foucault finishes by asking: “What governmen-
tality is possible as a strictly, intrinsically, and autono-
mously socialist governmentality? In any case, we know 
only that if there is a really socialist governmentality, then 
it is not hidden within socialism and its texts. It cannot be 
deduced from them. It must be invented” (bP 94).
In what follows, we will confront the issues that Fou-
paradigm. According to Foucault, this paradigm renders 
the question of the state increasingly irrelevant, becoming 
nothing but the accumulation of different modes of “stati-
fication”: “The state is nothing else but the mobile effect of 
a regime of multiple governmentalities” (bP 77). The cur-
rent withering of the nation-state under the pressure of 
multinational corporations and supranational trade agree-
ments only testifies to this claim. Under the paradigm of 
liberal governmentality, states alone or in conjunction are 
no longer in any position to control or distribute wealth, 
or life and death, among their respective populations.
This brings Foucault to observe that, within the 
context of an analysis of the post-WWII renunciation of 
socialist principles by the German Socialist Party (and 
a fortiori all other left-wing parties in Europe), “what 
socialism lacks is not so much a theory of the state as 
a governmental reason, the definition of what govern-
mental rationality would be in socialism, that is to say, a 
reasonable and calculable measure of the extent, modes, 
and objectives of governmental action”  (bP 91–2). Dif-
ferent types of socialism may, however, be “connected 
up to liberal governmentality,” functioning as a “coun-
terweights, as a corrective, and a palliative to internal 
dangers”  (bP 92). But socialism may function just as well 
under a “police state,” operating “as the internal logic of 
an administrative apparatus”  (bP 92–3). 
In none of these cases, a truly socialist governmental-
ity is to be discerned. As Foucault points out, this shows 
the fundamental asymmetry between liberalism and so-
cialism: one only asks the latter whether it be true or not; 
liberal governmentality, on the contrary, has nothing to 
do with the truth. It is worth quoting the entire passage, 
because it explicitly introduces “reading and interpret-
ing”  — and with it the entire problematics I have tried to 
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it, next to large black blot, the most prominent on the 
entire surface, some oil stains at the bottom the paper. 
They could have originally part of de Kooning’s draw-
ing or maybe Rauschenberg’s table was dirty. A reddish 
smudge a bit below the center of the painting is the most 
colorful element, it may hide yet another fingerprint. 
There are decidedly less smudges on the left side of the 
paper. Perhaps there was less drawing on the left side? I 
can discern at least one figure, in the lower left quadrant 
of the image: a female figure, perhaps a sketch for one 
of de Kooning’s large nudes; de Kooning reportedly said 
that he wanted to give Rauschenberg an image he would 
miss.28 Behind or above her, dimly emanating from the 
underground — “background ”  seems to be too strong 
a word — perhaps some other (partial) figure emerges 
fig.  2.  U
nprocessed infrared scan of Robert R
auschenberg’ s Erased de Kooning 
Drawing ( 1953)  showing traces of the original drawing by Willem de Kooning.  
Infrared scan:  Robin D.  M
yers,  2010,  courtesy S
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cault raises here as regards the conditions of possibility 
for a “socialist governmentality.” That is, on the one 
hand, its tentative “ invention”  outside or beyond “so-
cialism and its texts,” and, on the other, an investigation 
into the precise consequences of the displacement of 
governmental action with “reading and interpreting.” 
Through an inspection of Giorgio Agamben’s extension 
of Foucault’s research it will appear, however, that this 
invention — which like any real invention can present 
nothing but a radical break with the paradigm of liberal 
governmentality analyzed by Foucault — dispenses with 
the idea of governmentality as such, and is predicated on 
the complete inoperativity of a community. It is in this 
inoperativity that reading returns.
The yellowish paper looks more like a meticulously 
rubbed-down, smooth vellum, with its wavy edges and 
irregularities that may well be stretch marks. Rauschen-
berg’s act of erasure — which took two months27 — has 
not only nearly fully erased de Kooning’s drawing, but 
also honed its material carrier. Nonetheless there are 
some traces left of the underdrawing. We can distinguish 
two sharply defined blots on a diagonal line in the upper 
right corner of the same color as a brownish dot halfway 
on the right edge of the paper, next to what looks like 
a partial fingerprint in the same color. Two smudges of 
an undefined color seem to lie halfway on the two sides 
of a triangle that can be drawn between the blots in 
the upper right corner and the dot the with finger print 
halfway on the right side. That smudge with the finger-
print is maybe de Kooning’s, still identifying the pic-
ture as originally his. A larger oily discoloration below 
V I N C E N T  W . J .  V A N  G E R V E N  O E I R E T U R N  T O  R E A D I N G212 213
well be that Agamben attends to the legal and religious 
categories that he feels Foucault has disregarded, but at 
the same time, the questions of sexuality so pertinently 
raised by Foucault later in his career, have no place in his 
Agamben’s work.
The philological, genealogical, and archaeological project 
formulated by Giorgio Agamben under the header of 
Homo Sacer may be considered a continuation of Fou-
cault’s work on biopolitics and governmentality.34 The 
introduction to the first volume of Homo Sacer, subtitled 
Sovereign Power and Bare Life, Agamben proposes, inter 
alia, to extend the timeframe of Foucault’s investigation, 
relocating the biopolitical point of origin in Greek phi-
losophy, that is, in the Aristotelian distinction between 
zoē and bios.35 This initial distinction sets off the discus-
sion of a range of polarities, which will give the rise to 
the suggestion of a “form-of-life,” “to think politics […] 
beginning from the inoperative disarticulation of both 
bios and zoē”36 that eludes governmentality, from what 
appears to be the very heart of governmentality itself.
The question of governmentality is addressed in 
volume II.2 of Homo Sacer, entitled The Kingdom and the 
Glory, an interpretative tour de force that hunts down 
lost meanings, shifts in translation, and multiple ter-
minological crossovers. Agamben here provides a gene-
alogy of economy and government from a theological 
perspective, thus “completing”  Foucault’s research (KG 
xi). Apart from an extension of the temporal frame of 
investigation, Agamben also moves away from the in-
spection of the development of modern liberal economical 
policies, shifting back from Foucault’s insight that the idea 
faintly. An infrared image of the drawing — a technique 
used also in order to read ancient palimpsests — reveals 
a third figural form on the right (fig. 2), while the blots 
and smudges appear as white holes in the paper. Absence 
figures as presence and vice versa.
In the same period that de Kooning painted very 
large female nudes, Rauschenberg erases a small draw-
ing of one of them, a drawing, de Kooning insisted, that 
would be very hard to erase.29 But women are not the 
only figures under erasure; another way to read the title 
of the work, which involves improperly translating a 
proper name, yields Erased Drawing of the King.30 This 
is reading underneath the lines. I now also notice that 
there are no women in this text except for the one erased 
by Rauschenberg. Did his work spill over into my writ-
ing? We will see that even Agamben’s monastery is full 
of men contemplating form-of-life. 
And then there is this other effacement, which in 
certain regions of philosophy and art history continues 
to be patrolled. Rauschenberg and Jasper Johns, whose 
work Flag Buchloh discusses just after Erased de Kooning 
Drawing as an “equally conspicuous example,”31 used to 
be lovers.32 They lived, worked and slept together when 
all of this collage, ready-made, montage, the entire wave 
of allegorical procedures hit the American art scene. 
Maybe as a queer couple they were more receptive to 
the subversive aspects “appropriation and montage,” to 
the ability to “say in pictures, what would have been 
banned by the censors if […] said it in words.”33 So to 
return once more to Foucault who chastises the left for 
not developing a “socialist governmentality,” did he not 
already find such models in the San Francisco bathhous-
es, a governmentality at a far remove from the state, 
just before Agamben rendered it all chaste again? It may 
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in God (originating in the oikonomia of the Trinity43) 
and the specific nature of providential action, is neither 
“for itself,” nor “by accident”: “The god that reigns, yet 
does not govern, thus makes possible the government. 
In other words, the government is an epiphenomenon of 
providence”  (KG 118). Subsequently, Agamben interprets 
modern bureaucratic institutions, one of the foundations 
of modern governmentality, as again based on secular-
ized versions of the angelical hierarchies produced by 
Christian theology.44 These directly responded to the 
need to explain God ’s governance over the world, if in-
deed, following the nature of providential action, he did 
not govern every single detail of the world himself and 
immediately, nor was fully withdrawn from it. From this 
theological perspective, all politics proper in the gov-
ernment of the “City of God ”  until judgment day — the 
end of all political action — is necessarily angelic work. 
And this governmental work of providence only ends in 
a complete inoperativity of the angelic hierarchies, with 
only glory left to sing in a “Kingdom without Govern-
ment”  (KG 160): pure sovereignty without governmentali-
ty. Therefore, “[t]he political vocation of man is an angel-
ic vocation, and the angelic vocation is a vocation to the 
song of glory”  (KG 147). 
Setting out his beacons under the provisional head-
ing of an “archaeology of glory,” dedicated to the “histo-
ry of the ceremonial aspects of power and right; a sort of 
political archaeology of liturgy and protocol ”  (KG 168), 
Agamben indicates the intriguing paradox that although 
“glory is the exclusive property of God for eternity, 
and it will remain eternally identical in him […], glory is 
glorification, […] something that all creatures always and 
incessantly owe to God and that he demands from them” 
(KG 216). The resolution of this paradox is found in the 
of “government of men” be located in the organization of 
the Christian notion of pastorate37 to an investigation of 
theological sources from (late) antiquity and the medieval 
period.
Following back a thread already present in Rous-
seau’s Social Contract and Foucault’s references to it,38 
Agamben starts out with an analysis of the term econ-
omy from the perspective of the Trinitarian oikonomia, 
which “may constitute a privileged laboratory for the 
observation of the working and articulation — both in-
ternal and external — of the governmental machine”  (KG 
xi), in order to prove that instead of a series of counter-
practices against the pastorate, modern governmentality 
is much more the result of a thorough secularization of 
the conceptual framework built by theologians around 
the providence of divine government.39 This idea of sec-
ularization, which Agamben borrows from Carl Schmitt 
as nothing but a translation of theological concepts to 
political concepts operative to this very day,40 is an im-
portant methodological hinge in Agamben’s argument.41 
Nevertheless, Agamben himself suggests later that “[i]t is 
not necessary to share Schmitt’s thesis on secularization 
in order to affirm that political problems become more 
intelligible and clear if they are related to theological 
paradigms”  (KG 229). We may suggest, then, that the 
theological and political paradigms allegorize each other, 
even though “thresholds of indifference”  (KG 230) may 
show up between them. It is at these points of theologi-
cal and the political indiscernability that readability col-
lapses and only lingering signatures can be traced, being 
precisely that which operates on the threshold between 
semiotics and semantics, the signifier and the signified.42
This concept of providence, which is built upon a 
separation between the Kingdom and the Government 
V I N C E N T  W . J .  V A N  G E R V E N  O E I R E T U R N  T O  R E A D I N G216 217
of what we might consider a possible model for what 
Foucault called a socialist governmentality. That we end 
up finding such a model in monastic life should not sur-
prise us, considering the insistent tendency in all forms 
of “utopian socialism,” ever since its first formulation, to 
withdraw from society into small-scale communes. 
Importantly, the “new and unheard-of ”  invention 
“form-of-life”  itself is a point of indiscernability be-
tween form and life (HP xi–xii), in this case approached 
from the monastic tradition in which rule and life col-
lapse in an attempt to “realize their ideal of a communal 
form of life.” And this monastic invention of form-of-life 
indeed shows, according to Agamben, the only example 
of an actual social contract being formulated.50 The form–
content of monastic rule transports us straight back to 
Foucault’s concern with the invention of socialist gov-
ernmentality and the problem of “reading”  hampering 
its actual development. Ironically, it now appears that 
the “rule,” which is nothing but the materialization of a 
practice of reading and interpreting folding onto life, is 
precisely the realization of such a non-liberal governmen-
tality as cenoby, a “model of total communitarian life” 
(HP 9) fully outside Agamben’s paradigm of Kingdom and 
Government: “a human life entirely removed from the 
grasp of the law and a use of bodies and of the world that 
would never be substantiated into appropriation”  (HP 
xiii).51 A human life that is rendered fully inoperative and 
completely dedicated to the “glory of God ”  (HP 23).
The elaboration of this form-of-life is again couched 
in figures of (un)readability. Its study and elaboration re-
quire the consultation of “texts […] the reading of which 
seems so difficult to the modern reader”  (HP 4). Reading 
the rule — and explicitly not the epistemologico-juridi-
cal “knowing the law”  — becomes an essential element 
increased articulation of the split between the former, 
inclusive form of glory, which God possesses infinite-
ly, and the exclusive form, namely the glory that God 
receives from the mortals, which continually needs to be 
increased through the proselytizing work of the church. 
Eternal glorification is therefore also the only work, or, 
perhaps, “unwork,” that is left to the blessed after the 
Last Judgment, praise which is effectively useless, in so 
far God already possesses a plenitude of it.45
Having reached this point of the total collapse of 
oikonomia and governmentality — a point of indiscern-
ability in the heart of politics — into an eternal, inoper-
ative Sabbath that is only concerned with endless and 
timeless acclamation and glorification, Agamben singles 
out precisely this inoperativity, the “political substance 
of the Occident”  (KG 246),46 as the point through which 
a non-economical and non-governmental “form-of-life” 
can be — to employ Foucault’s term here — “ invented.”47 
As he indicates himself, this fully follows Agamben’s 
program, made explicit at the end of the eponymous first 
volume of Homo Sacer, to transform the biopolitical body 
“ into the site for the constitution and installation of a 
form of life that is wholly exhausted in bare life and a 
bios that is only its own zoē .”48
Finally then, this is the topic of the The Highest Pov-
erty, which deals with the form and function of monastic 
rules and form-of-life.49 This treatise addresses precisely 
the “hidden center” of the governmental machine opera-
tive both in Foucault’s and Agamben’s previous accounts: 
a center that is subtracted from the genealogy of govern-
mentality, while at the same time animating it. It is here, 
in a description of monastic “form-of-life” which, impor-
tantly, is fully subtracted from the administrative struc-
tures of the church, that Agamben arrives at a description 
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By reading the rule that prescribes to him the  
reading of the rule, the reader performatively  
executes the rule ipso facto. His lectio realizes,  
that is to say, the exemplary instance of an  
enunciation of the rule that coincides with  
its execution, of an observance that is  
rendered indiscernible from the  
command that it obeys.  
(HP 77)55
Thus reading — palimpsestuous reading — becomes the 
allegory par excellence for the rule of monastic life, the 
moment that rule and life fully coincide. At the same 
time it is an allegory of Foucault’s socialist governmen-
tality, invented and fully subtracted from the paradigms 
of governmentality from whose theological analogues 
the monastic movement equally tried to escape. De 
Man’s “allegories of unreadability,” as a continuous read-
ing and rereading — a lectio — of texts whose fundamen-
tals are impossible to gauge here, find their proper po-
litical actualization. Perhaps it would therefore be more 
accurate to revise Foucault’s statement that “the impor-
tance of the text in socialism is commensurate with the 
lacuna constituted by the absence of a socialist art of 
government”  (bP 94) into “the importance of the text in 
socialism is commensurate with the lacuna constituted 
by the presence of a the socialist art of government.”
in the testing period and initiation ceremony of a new 
monk,52 up to the point where he is admitted to the 
monastic community. At this point of collapse of life into 
rule and rule into life, the world world itself becomes 
eminently readable: “the perfect life”  in full devotion to 
God “coincides with the legibility of the world ”  (HP 27). 
Citing the opening lines of Rule of the Master,53 Agamben 
shows that this reading of the rule is never reducible to 
a contractual logic of read-and-signed, an unproblematic 
and unilateral transmission of information: “O man, (I 
say) first of all to you who read (me), and then you who 
are listening to me as I speak…” (HP 76). Thus the rule it-
self, being read and read to, being spoken and listened to, 
continually calls into question its own written form and 
the predominance of writing.54 This should not surprise 
us, as the very material on which these rules were writ-
ten was often a palimpsest, a piece of parchment from 
which the original text of a more worldly, perhaps legal 
or literary nature, had been scraped. Living according to 
the rule is defined as a lectio continua, that is, according 
to the injunction to read that is contained in the rule 
that is read everyday. Agamben sketches this aporetic 
situation as follows:
One must thus imagine 
 that there will necessarily be 
 a moment when the reader, having 
 reached chapter 24, will read the passage  
that enjoins him to read the rule every day.  
What will happen at that moment? In reading  
the other passages of the rule, the reader executes 
the precept of the reading, but does not actualize 
what the text enjoins him to do in that moment. In 
this case, however, the reading and putting into 
action of the rule coincide without remainder.  
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